#industroyer2

Live, measured metrics for the hashtag #industroyer2 from the open social web. Every number carries a named source and the time it was fetched. Nothing is estimated.

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0
Uses / 7 days
Mastodon
0
Accounts / 7 days
Mastodon
4
Recent posts
Mastodon
~0/hr
Recent pace
Mastodon · last 4
0
Avg reactions / post
Mastodon · last 4

Day-by-day usage

measured · fosstodon.org (Mastodon public tags API) · fetched 2026-07-28 10:49 UTC
0
07-22
0
07-23
0
07-24
0
07-25
0
07-26
0
07-27
0
07-28

0 uses by 0 unique accounts across the window. Real per-day counts, not estimates. Newest bar is today so far.

Related hashtags

measured · fosstodon.org (Mastodon public search API) · fetched 2026-07-28 10:49 UTC

No related tags with measured usage found for #industroyer2.

Live pulse

measured · fosstodon.org (Mastodon tag timeline) · fetched 2026-07-28 10:49 UTC

Everything below is measured over the latest 4 public posts (spanning ~618 hours).

Top of the latest posts

  • We're getting into "silly season" at the end of the year. With that in mind, I've thought about the things I did in 2022 that I found most interesting, helpful, or potentially impactful. First, there's the paper on #CTI-driven #ThreatHuntin

    Joe Słowik@[email protected]052022-12-19 16:09 UTCView post →
  • @kimzetter I'm honestly not sure? If that malware was designed to impact critical civilian infrastructure (eg, #Industroyer2), I'd say mitigating or defeating that represents a defensible, appropriate action given the targeting and intent.

    Joe Słowik@[email protected]012022-12-08 02:16 UTCView post →
  • There are similarities with previous attacks conducted by #Sandworm: a PowerShell script used to distribute the .NET ransomware from the domain controller is almost identical to the one seen last April during the #Industroyer2 attacks again

    ESET Research@[email protected]002022-11-25 17:06 UTCView post →

Every number above is measured from a named public API at the shown fetch time. Nothing is estimated or extrapolated. Platforms that lock their data behind paid APIs are not shown. Agents: the same numbers, as JSON, at /api/hashtags/industroyer2